SUMMARY ORDER

Shkelzen Balia, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of a February 26, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the September 14, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Alan A. Vomacka, which denied Balia’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Shkelzen Baila, No. A098 277 002 (B.I.A. Feb. 26, 2013), aff'g No. A098 277 002 (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. Sept. 14, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

A past persecution finding creates a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, which the government may rebut by demonstrating a fundamental change in circumstances in the applicant’s native country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A). In this case, the agency concluded that the success of the Albanian Democratic Party in multiple recent national elections undermined the presumption that Balia would be persecut *782 ed in the future because Albanian Socialist Party members had previously persecuted him based on his support of the Democratic Party. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (We “require no robotic incantation by an IJ when stating for the record that, for example, Albania is no longer a Communist tyranny run by a psychopath.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Balia argues that Albania is still a corrupt state and that Albanian police sometimes operate with impunity. However, generalized violence does not give rise to an asylum claim, and in any event Balia fails to demonstrate that he has an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground, or that anyone seeks to harm him specifically. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999). Because Balia did not establish the objective likelihood of future harm needed to make out an asylum claim, he is necessarily unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal or CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005).

In certain circumstances, an IJ may grant asylum to an applicant who has established past persecution, but not a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(iii); Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2006). This so-called “humanitarian asylum” has been reserved for applicants who have suffered atrocious forms of persecution or who may suffer other serious harm upon their return. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(iii); Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989). To merit a grant of humanitarian asylum on the basis of severe past persecution, an applicant must demonstrate “long-lasting physical or mental effects of his persecution.” Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2007).

Balia states that he was beaten on several occasions and threatened with death if he did not stop supporting the Democratic Party, but he fails to discuss what lasting physical or emotional impact this harm had on him. The agency did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Balia failed to demonstrate that the persecution he suffered was so severe as to warrant humanitarian asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); Jalloh, 498 F.3d at 151-52; Hoxhallari, 468 F.3d at 184 (upholding the denial of humanitarian asylum to a supporter of the Albanian Democratic Party who had been beaten and harassed on six occasions).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).