SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Dong Mei Shao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 10, 2013, decision of *812 the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Dong Mei Shao, No. A077 122 571 (B.I.A. May 10, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity, with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The BIA’s denial of Shao’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005). An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Shao’s 2013 motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was her third motion to reopen, and the final administrative decision was issued in 2003. However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii).

As the BIA noted, Shao’s 2012 conversion to Catholicism reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions, and therefore does not exempt her motion from the applicable bars. See Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2006). Shao did not submit any evidence regarding country conditions in China or the treatment of Catholics there. She did submit two letters, one from someone claiming to be her sister, and one from a friend in China, in which the friend stated that he was detained and tortured because he was Catholic. However, neither letter establishes that the treatment of Catholics is now worse than it was in 2001, at the time of Shao’s hearing. See Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Shao did not establish changed country conditions which would excuse the time limit for filing her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

Because Shao’s failure to show an exception to the time and number bars is dispos-itive of her motion to reopen, we do not address the BIA’s additional finding that she did not establish her prima facie eligibility for relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.