SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Manokus Fields appeals the judgment of the District Court sentencing him principally to a term of 97 months’ imprisonment after being found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. On appeal, defendant contends that the District Court erroneously instructed the jury with regard to the “buyer-seller exception” to conspiracy liability and with regard to its determination of the quantity of cocaine attributable to the defendant. 1 Counsel for defendant Joseph Jackson moves to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and the Government moves to dismiss Jackson’s appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.

I. Jury Instructions

A jury instruction is flawed if “it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the *34 jury on the law.” United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Challenged jury instructions are reviewed de novo but will be reversed “only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused a defendant prejudice.” United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, a district court “enjoys broad discretion in crafting its instructions, which is only circumscribed by the requirement that the charge be fair to both sides.” United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 53 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, contrary to defendant’s assertions, the jury instructions for both the “buyer-seller exception” and the quantity.of cocaine attributable to defendant were legally correct and not misleading to the jury.

II. Anders Motion

Frank J. Riccio II, counsel for defendant Joseph Jackson, moves for permission to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The Government moves to dismiss the appeal based on defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights. 2

We agree with Jackson’s counsel and the Government that there were no meritorious issues to be raised on appeal because (1) Jackson’s guilty plea was valid; (2) he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal; and (3) his sentence was reasonable. However, because Jackson’s waiver did not mention the special assessment and because he explicitly reserved the right to contest the forfeiture of two cash seizures totaling $72, 325.07, they are outside the scope of his waiver and he is not barred from challenging them on appeal. Nevertheless, these claims are not meritorious as both were mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(l)-(2) respectively.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments brought by the appellants and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the: (1) judgment of the District Court with regard to defendant Manokus Fields is AFFIRMED; (2) the Anders motion with regard to defendant Joseph Jackson is GRANTED; (3) Government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to the appeal of defendant Jackson’s conviction, terms of imprisonment, supervised release, and the agreed-upon portion of his forfeiture; and (4) Government’s motion to dismiss with respect to the appeal of defendant Jackson’s special assessment and the contested portion of his forfeiture is construed as a motion for summary affirmance, and, as so construed, is GRANTED.