SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-appellants, three disabled and retired Syracuse police officers, appeal from two District Court judgments, both dated August 5, 2013, granting defendantsappellees’ motions for summary judgment and from the District Court’s post-judgment orders of November 6, 2013 denying relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b). Plaintiffs James Mullen and Karl Schmidt and plaintiff Nicholas Vassenelli had initiated two actions by complaints dated September 16, 2010 and November 24, 2010, respectively, against the City of Syracuse, Syracuse Police Department officials, private third-party benefits administrator POMCO Group, and other individual defendants. Plaintiffs asserted numerous claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, inter *60 alia, all arising out of a municipal policy change that allegedly affected plaintiffs’ access to medical care and benefits guaranteed by New York state law. Plaintiffs also challenge on appeal several District Court orders affirming discovery orders issued by Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles. Because these two cases, which were argued in tandem, concern coincident issues, present substantively similar facts, and seek identical relief, we consolidate them for disposition. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the cases.

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment and “resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[ ] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must affirm a summary judgment order when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[C]onclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the District Court’s summary dismissal of their procedural and substantive due process claims. It is axiomatic that “[t]he first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property or ‘liberty. ” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59,119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). To establish a substantive due process claim, plaintiffs must further demonstrate that the deprivation “is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District Court found that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently establish actual deprivation of necessary medical care guaranteed under New York General Municipal Law § 207-c, and further failed to demonstrate “conscience-shocking behavior.” Mullen et al. v. City of Syracuse et al., No. 5:10-cv-1110 (DNH), Dkt. 157 at 14-17, 22 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013); Vassenelli v. City of Syracuse et al., No. 5:10— cv-1422 (DNH), Dkt. 240 at 15-19, 27 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013). Upon an independent review of the record, we agree. In light of the failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to either procedural or substantive due process claims, summary judgment was properly granted. 1

We review the denial of a motion brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) for “abuse of discretion.” Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009); see In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion if it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly *61 erroneous assessment of the evidence, or render[s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). We apply the same “abuse of discretion” standard of review to a district court’s discovery rulings, bearing in mind that a “district court has broad discretion to manage pre-trial discovery.” Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the district court has referred a non-dispositive matter to a magistrate judge for decision, the district court shall set aside the order only insofar as it “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions, which essentially attempted to relitigate issues already resolved. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Similarly, the District Court acted well within its discretion in denying as meritless plaintiffs’ objections to Magistrate Judge Peebles’s orders. 2

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiffs on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgments and orders of February 4, 2013, May 28, 2013, August 5, 2013 and November 6, 2013.