SUMMARY ORDER

In this pro se challenge to provisions of New York State Election Law relating to the designation of candidates for political office, plaintiffs Martin Dekom, Kenneth Jacoby, and Carol Pendleton (on behalf of the Estate of Robert Pendleton) appeal the dismissal of their action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6), as well as the denial of their motions for recusal of the district judge, and for the referral of their suit to a three-judge panel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm largely for the reasons stated by the district court.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and to admit a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and pleadings that “are no more than conclusions ... are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are likewise re- *17 viewed de novo. See Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 2012).

Although this court has not explicitly identified the standard of review for denial of a motion for reassignment to a three-judge panel under 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-2, we have recognized a similar three-judge panel requirement as jurisdictional, see Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 2008), thus triggering de novo review.

We review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2008). Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or “[wjhere he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Under § 455, the relevant inquiry is “whether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal, or alternatively, whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would question the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 169 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying these principles to the record here, we conclude for the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough decision that (1) the amended complaint was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, (2) the three-judge panel requirement under § 1973aa-2 was inapplicable, and (3) there is no basis for reasonably questioning the impartiality of the district judge so as to require recusal.

We have considered all of plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are also without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.