*63 SUMMARY ORDER

Yasser Lawani appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brodie, /.), sentencing him to 60 months of imprisonment for conspiring to export stolen motor vehicles (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 553(a)(1)) and for filing false federal income tax returns (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Lawani claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, citing two alleged errors in the calculation of the advisory guidelines range: (1) imposing an enhancement for obstruction of justice, and (2) refusing to apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Both arguments are meritless.

1. “On review of a district court’s decision to enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice, we accept the court’s findings of facts unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Pena, 751 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review de novo a ruling that the established facts constitute obstruction of justice, giving due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court made two independent findings relating to obstruction. First, based on a series of recorded telephone calls from jail, the court found that Lawani instructed his brother to destroy evidence relating to his crime and discussed the possibility of fleeing the country if released on bail. Second, the court found that La-wani lied under oath at the trial of his (co-defendant) brother. These factual findings are not clearly erroneous. •

Directing others to destroy evidence of a crime, planning an escape, and perjury each may suffice as obstruction of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (destruction of evidence); United States v. Aponte, 31 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (flight with intent to avoid judicial proceedings); United States v. Savoca, 596 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (perjury at trial of a co-defendant). Moreover, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 covers failed attempts as well as acts of successful obstruction. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 286 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). So the district court’s decision to impose an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is affirmed.

2. As to the court’s refusal to apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, a defendant may qualify for such a reduction if the district court finds that “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

On appeal, “a district court’s determination whether a defendant is entitled to credit for acceptance of responsibility merits ‘great deference’ because the ‘sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.’ ” United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 146 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5). The question is one of fact, so “a district court’s determination in this regard will not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.” United States v. Taylor, 475 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Although Lawani pleaded guilty, “[a] defendant ‘who enters a guilty plea is not *64 entitled to an adjustment [for acceptance of responsbility] as a matter of right.’” United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 635 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 3). More to the point here, a defendant who obstructs justice is typically dis-entitled to such a reduction. See id. (an obstruction enhancement forecloses an acceptance of responsibility reduction except in “extraordinary cases”) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 4).

The district court found that Lawani’s perjury at his brother’s trial — which took place after Lawani entered his guilty plea — “belies the fact that [Lawani] ha[d] indeed accepted responsibility for what happened here.” The district court’s refusal to treat Lawani’s as an “extraordinary case” (i.e., one in which the reduction was warranted notwithstanding the obstruction) was not without foundation. So, we affirm.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Lawani’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.