SUMMARY ORDER

Bin Yang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an August 26, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the August 9, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”), denying, his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bin Yang, No. A201 295 507 (B.I.A. Aug. 26, 2013), aff'g No. A201 295 507 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 9, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decisions of the IJ and the BIA “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

For asylum applications like Yang’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on inconsistencies in asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). ‘We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per cu-riam). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

First, the agency reasonably relied on the fact that Yang omitted from his asylum application that he was forced to perform “hard manual labor” during his three detentions because he included less impor *72 tant details about those detentions. See id. (providing that for purposes of analyzing a credibility determination, “[a]n inconsistency and an omission are ... functionally equivalent”). The agency was not compelled to credit his explanation that he did not like to think about such things because his application detailed more disturbing incidents. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

The agency also did not err in finding that Yang’s statements at his credible fear interview were reliably transcribed and were inconsistent with his testimony regarding the number of times he was detained in China. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency may consider inconsistencies between credible fear interview and testimony, so long as interview is conducted in a non-coercive manner and accurately documented). The agency also reasonably found. inconsistent a friend’s letter that failed to mention Yang’s alleged detentions and Yang’s testimony that the friend knew of the harm he suffered in China, as well as Yang’s government-issued baptism certificate and his claim that he feared persecution for practicing in an unregistered church. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Yang did not provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81.

Having questioned Yang’s credibility, the agency reasonably determined that his failure to provide corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the agency reasonably found Yang not credible. That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).