SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s January 22, 2014 order denying his motion to reopen his racial discrimination case against the City University of New York, Brooklyn College, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We generally review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2012). However, we review de novo the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 2005). “Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270-71, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010).

Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly denied Williams’s Rule 60 motion, substantially for the reasons stated in its January 22, 2014 order. As the District Court found, Williams’s claims under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) were time barred. Nor did Williams cite any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that warranted equitable tolling. Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Williams’s arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) were also meritless because the District Court’s revocation of informa pauperis status was expressly authorized by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Moreover, in previously dismissing Williams’s direct appeal as frivolous, we implicitly determined that the District Court’s dismissal of his amended complaint was proper. See Order, Williams v. City Univ. of N.Y., Brooklyn Coll., No. 12-54 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2012).

As to Williams’s Rule 60(d)(3) claim, although the District Court appears to have construed that claim under Rule 60(b)(3) or (4), Williams nevertheless failed to show any fraud on the court. The record demonstrates that the District Court was well aware that Williams’s course registration bar remained in effect when it issued its judgment of dismissal. Moreover, the District Court’s judgment did not rely on whether the registration bar was temporary. Accordingly, Williams has not shown a “grave miscarriage of justice” that warrants setting aside the District Court’s judgment. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Williams on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s January 22, 2014 order.

Finally, we note that Williams appears to have an extensive history of meritless and vexatious litigation. See, e.g., *86 Williams v. Schwartz, 529 Fed.Appx. 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2013); Order, Williams v. Calderoni, No. 11-3046 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2012); Order, Williams v. City Univ. of N.Y., Brooklyn Coll., No. 12-54 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2012); Williams v. Home Depot USA Inc., 196 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2006). Williams is hereby advised that any future frivolous appeals, motions, or other filings could result in the imposition of sanctions, including an order barring any future filings without approval by this Court. See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (“If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).