SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff David Gertner appeals from the District Court’s January 7, 2014 judgment, after an eight-day bench trial, in favor of defendant Pace University (“Pace”) on Gertner’s claim for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Gertner alleges that Pace discriminated against him on the basis of his Brazilian national origin when it denied him a promotion to the position of full professor. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

When reviewing a judgment following a bench trial, we review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A, 760 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2014). Under the clearly erroneous standard, “the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6). “We are not allowed to second-guess the court’s credibility assessments,” and “[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Diesel Props S.r.l. v. Greystone Bus. Credit II LLC, 631 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly granted judgment in favor of Pace, substantially for the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned January 7, 2014 order. Namely, the preponderance of the evidence did not show that Pace’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Gertner was a pretext for discrimination. Based on the District Court’s extensive findings, neither Pace’s inconsistent promotion standards, stray comments, imposition of an onerous course schedule, nor promotion of non-Brazilian faculty, either individually or collectively, established any discriminatory intent on the basis of Gertner’s Brazilian national origin.

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s January 7, 2014 judgment.