SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Investment bank Plaintiff The PrinceR-idge Group LLC (“PrinceRidge”) appeals *39 from the February 4, 2014 award of summary judgment in favor of real estate developer defendant Oppidan, Inc. (“Oppi-dan”) on New York State law claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing stemming from Oppidan’s failure to pay PrinceRidge a 1.875% “Success Fee” for its advisory services in connection with Oppidan’s sale of $100 million in real property.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Disk, 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This appeal turns on whether the services rendered by PrinceRidge are covered under New York Real Property Law § 442-d, which states that

[n]o person, copartnership, limited liability company, or corporation shall bring or maintain an action ... for the recovery of compensation for services rendered ... in the buying, selling, exchanging, leasing or negotiating a loan upon any real estate without alleging and proving that such person was a duly licensed real estate broker or real estate salesman on the date when the alleged cause of action arose.

N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 442-d. New York courts have construed this provision to apply where “the dominant feature of the transaction at issue is the transfer of real property.” Panarello v. Segallo, 6 A.D.3d 515, 516, 775 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2d Dep’t 2004) (citing N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 442-d).

Here, there is no genuine dispute that the dominant feature of the relevant transaction — Oppidan’s sale of real properties— was the transfer of real property. Moreover, there is no genuine dispute that the services provided by PrinceRidge, which was not a licensed real estate broker or salesman on the date the alleged causes of action arose, 1 were in the nature of brokerage services, even if we accept PrinceR-idge’s claim that its role was that of a “finder,” rather than a “broker.” See Kas-pi v. Wainstein, 116 A.D.3d 412, 412, 983 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dep’t 2014) (holding that § 442-d bars action “if the money sought or any portion thereof is for a finder’s or broker’s fee and he did not have a broker’s or salesman’s license”); Futersak v. Perl, 84 A.D.3d 1309,1311, 923 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep’t 2011) (Section 442-d’s bar against seeking a commission without a broker’s license “applies even if the services rendered are characterized as those of a ‘finder’”); Sorice v. DuBois, 25 A.D.2d 521, 267 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dep’t 1966) (“If real estate is going to be the principal element involved in the transaction a broker has to have a license and cannot evade its necessity by referring to the services as origi *40 nating or introducing or any other fantastic term.”) (citation omitted). 2

Although the N.Y. Court of Appeals has not squarely decided a case applying § 442-d to such a context, the intermediate appellate courts cases cited above are “not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” DiBella v. Hopkins, 408 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967) (even though the decisions of lower state courts are not controlling “where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point,” such decisions “should be attributed some weight”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is no basis for concluding that the NY. Court of Appeals would interpret the requirements of § 442-d differently than the intermediate state appellate courts, the District Court properly concluded that § 442-d barred PrinceRidge’s suit against Oppidan.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by PrineeRidge on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s February 4, 2014 judgment.