SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Ronald Robert Fox, III appeals from the judgment of the District Court affirming the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security of Fox’s application for Social Security benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing the denial of an SSI claim, “[w]e undertake a plenary review of the administrative record, and our focus is on the administrative ruling more than on the district court’s decision.” Lamay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.Bd 508, 507 (2d Cir. 2009). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard and whether substantial evidence supported its conclusions. See Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2013). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla[;] [i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117,127 (2d Cir. 2008)). In evaluating whether the requisite substantial evidence exists, we “defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting evidence,” Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012), and can reject findings of fact “only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise,” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Plaintiff challenges the disability determination on the grounds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly discounted Fox’s treating physician’s opinion and improperly assessed witness credibility. Plaintiffs argument that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions provided by Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vie-rhile is belied by the ALJ’s opinion itself, which states that the form report completed by Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vierhile “has been considered,” but was unpersuasive in certain respects to the ALJ because “certain of the more extreme/marked limitations assessed are inconsistent with the claimant’s activities of daily living and the record as a whole, and are unsupported by contemporaneously reported examination notes.” Appellant’s App’x at 46. Where, as here, a treating physician’s assessment is contradicted by other substantial record evidence, including the testimony of the plaintiff and the opinions of other medical experts, the ALJ properly denied controlling weight to Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vierhile’s form report. Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004); Veino v. Barn-hart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002).

The ALJ’s impairment and credibility determinations are also supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ carefully evaluated the record regarding Fox’s limitations (or lack thereof) in the six functional equivalency domains set forth in 20 C.F.R. *37 416.926a, concluding that Fox had a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, less than marked limitations in four other domains and no significant limitations at all in a final domain. In so determining, the ALJ relied upon extensive record evidence, including testimony from Fox and his mother, Fox’s school reports, physician and medical expert reports, and information regarding Fox’s successful participation in a vocational welding program, ability to pass the GED exam in one sitting, involvement in a recreational bowling league, and relationship with a long-term girlfriend. Based upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that plaintiffs arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the March 25, 2014 judgment of the District Court.