SUMMARY ORDER

Aurel Smith, an inmate in the custody of the New York Department of Corrections arid Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against three senior officials in DOCCS’s central office in Albany (the “Supervisory Defendants”), as well as against Daniel Martus-cello, the Superintendent of the Coxsackie Correctional Facility, where Smith was incarcerated from January 2009 through July 2010. Smith filed his complaint on behalf of himself and a putative class of inmates “who either currently reside or did reside (via their incarceration) at Cox-sackie Correctional Facility.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Smith alleges that he witnessed and personally experienced corrections officers at Coxsackie routinely assault inmates and then file prison disciplinary charges falsely accusing the inmates of instigating the violence. In January 2012, Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. On September 25, 2012, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Smith v. Martuscello, No. 9:10-CV-1532 (NAM/RFT), 2012 WL 4378125, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012). We otherwise assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We review de novo a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). This appeal involves only whether the dismissal of Smith’s claims against the Supervisory Defendants was proper.

Smith sues the Supervisory Defendants in their official capacities, as officers of the state. See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 6-8. “A suit against a state officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 57 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986). Because “a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation,” in order for Smith to have a viable claim against the Supervisory Defendants, he must allege a state ‘“policy or custom’ [that] played a part in the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). 1

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual mat *552 ter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1987, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though Smith’s amended complaint contains allegations of widespread abuse in the prison system, and at Coxsackie in particular, it contains no allegations that the abuse was the result of a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to inmate abuse.

Indeed, we found similar allegations insufficient in our decision in Webb v. Goord, noting that “[a]malgamating more than forty discrete incidents of misconduct by DOCS officials does not make for a sustainable lawsuit ... [TJaken together, the claims do not establish the existence of a policy or practice existing throughout the DOCS system, or within a single DOCS facility.” 340 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed, we distinguished between cases in which “systemic abuses were at issue” and those involving “a series of discrete incidents taking place within a, single prison system over a long period of time.” Id. at 110. We conclude that Smith’s claim is of the latter type. Because he fails to allege a state policy or custom of deliberate indifference to inmate abuse, his claim was properly dismissed.

We have considered all of Smith’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.