SUMMARY ORDER

Jamaine Ryder appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Suddaby, J.), sentencing him to concurrent terms of 57 months’ imprisonment on one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Ryder argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed facts relevant to the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range. This claim is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ghailani 733 F.3d 29, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1523, 188 L.Ed.2d 464 (2014).

“[I]t is well established that a district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve sentencing disputes, as long as the defendant is afforded ‘some opportunity to rebut the [government’s allegations.’ ” Id. at 54 (quoting United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 280 (2d Cir. 2012)); accord United States v. Phillips, 431 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2005).

Ryder had several opportunities to challenge the government’s position on the two issues he cites in this, appeal: the total loss amount of the check-cashing conspiracy for which Ryder could properly have been held responsible; and Ryder’s leadership role. Ryder proffered facts and arguments relating to these issues in his objections to the Presentence Report, in his sentencing memorandum, and in his counsel’s argument to the district court at the sentencing hearing. Because Ryder had several opportunities to make his arguments about loss amount and his leadership role, the refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve these issues was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the Sentencing Guideline application adopted by the district court was not inconsistent with the defendant’s factual proffers.

*42 For the first time in his reply brief, Ryder asserts that the district court erred in failing to state in open court, with specificity, its reasons for rejecting Ryder’s sentencing arguments. We do not consider this argument, because it was raised for the first time in Ryder’s reply brief, depriving the government of an opportunity to respond. Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 568 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2014).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Ryder’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.