SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners, both natives and citizens of China, seek review of a June 5, 2014, decision of the BIA, affirming the February 8, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied Meiqing’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 2 In re Meiqing, Jinding Huang, Nos. A200 926 271, A205 218 835 (B.I.A. June 5, 2014), aff'g Nos. A200 926 271, A205 218 835 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 8, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the decisions of the IJ and the BIA “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

For asylum applications like Meiqing’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence, “without regard to whether” the inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

Initially, Meiqing asserts that she was denied due process because the IJ admitted into evidence an asylum officer’s assessment to refer without the officer being called to testify. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the heightened procedural protections of a criminal trial do not apply to the admission of documentary evidence in a removal proceeding. See Felzcerek v. *45 INS, 75 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1996). Instead, evidence may be admitted if it does not violate the alien’s right to due process of law, that is, “if it is probative and its use is fundamentally fair.” Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1997). Fairness in this context “is closely related to the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence.” Id. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that Meiqing did not (and does not now) question the reliability of the assessment to refer, it was not error for the IJ to admit the evidence without requiring the asylum officer to testify. 3 Thus, the IJ properly considered the assessment to refer and reasonably found the following inconsistencies negatively affected Meiqing’s credibility.

First, the agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency concerning whether Meiqing had a medical exam following her alleged forced abortion. Meiqing denied ever having a medical exam in China following her forced abortion, but Jinding testified that she did indeed return to the doctor for an examination.

Second, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies concerning Meiqing’s alleged abortion certificate. Meiqing testified that she was forced to have an abortion on November 3, 2010. However, the abortion certificate itself reflected that her abortion occurred on November 3, 2011, a year later. Meiqing explained that the doctor had mistakenly recorded the date, and that she was given the abortion certificate on the day of her abortion. Jinding, however, testified that he and Meiqing were not given the abortion certificate in China and did not even see it until Meiq-ing’s mother mailed it to them in the United States. And the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies concerning when the Petitioners discovered that the certificate contained the wrong date.

The agency reasonably relied further on inconsistencies regarding how many passports Meiqing had been issued, how many times she had left China, whether her mother initially refused to pay Meiqing’s fine, and where Meiqing lived when immigration proceedings were initiated. The agency also reasonably determined that the other record evidence failed to rehabilitate Meiqing’s incredible testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007).

Given these findings, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. That determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief as those claims are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in .this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).