SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Natalie M. Williams,- pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her amended complaint, which primarily alleges claims under - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Williams, formerly a tenured teacher in the New York City public school system, was terminated after being found guilty of misconduct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure 't'o state a claim, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations'.in,the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a cláim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Williams’s claims. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned March 26, 2014 decision.

•Contrary to Williams’s contentions on appeal, the record reflects that her proposed amended complaint was docketed and considered by both the magistrate judge and the district court. Further, the court did not err by deferring discovery until after it ruled on the motion to dismiss: “a plaintiff is not entitled to discovery if his pleadings are fatally and incurably defective as a matter of law.” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). Finally, Williams’s claim that the district court and magistrate judge were biased against her is not supported by the record. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).

On the merits, the district court correctly dismissed Williams’s ADEA claim, because even accepting her factual allegations as true, “concern with the elevated costs of senior employees does not constitute age discrimination.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-13, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Williams does not argue that her age, as distinguished from her pension eligibility, played any role in her termination, or that such eligibility was a “direct function of age[,] rather than years of service[].” Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1997).

As to Williams’s other claims, and the other grounds for dismissal relied upon by the district court, Williams has not raised any relevant arguments in her briefs on appeal, so we need not consider them. See *30 LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).

We have considered all of Williams’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.