SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Bottom appeals from a judgment of the district court granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss Bottom’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Bottom alleged that Defendants George E. Pataki, Brion D. Travis, and Glenn S. Goord violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution as a result of the New York State Board of Parole’s (“the Board”) decision to deny Bottom parole. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). Pro se complaints, such as the complaint filed by Bottom, “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they sug *40 gest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Due Process Claim

Bottom’s complaint, construed and interpreted liberally, alleged that his due process rights were violated when the Board denied him parole for two reasons: (1) the Board had predetermined his parole outcome through its policy of denying parole to violent felons, and therefore had failed to consider the statutory factors enumerated in New York’s parole statute, Executive Law § 259 — i; and (2) the Board’s decision to deny Bottom parole was motivated by factors outside of those enumerated in § 259 — i, in particular by a pecuniary interest in receiving federal funding through truth-in-sentencing incentive grants under 42 U.S.C. § 13704.

As an initial matter, “[t]he New York parole scheme is not one that creates in any prisoner a legitimate expectancy of release,” and prisoners in New York “have no liberty interest” in receiving parole. Bama v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). We have identified some “minimal due process rights” in parole proceedings, but those minimal rights are “limited to not being denied parole for [constitutionally] arbitrary or impermissible reasons,” which requires a showing of “egregious official conduct.” Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 115, 116 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding Bottom’s claim that the Board had a policy of denying parole to violent felons, we recently held in Grazi-ano that “even if New York State implemented an official policy denying parole to all violent offenders, such a policy would not violate the Due Process Clause even if the policy were adopted or implemented in violation of state law” because “[a] blanket policy denying parole to violent felony offenders simply does not constitute egregious official conduct.” Id. at 116. Bottom argues that Graziano is distinguishable because he alleged the Board failed to consider the § 259-i factors other than seriousness of the offense in his parole hearing, but this allegation was similarly made by the plaintiffs in Graziano. See id. at 118 (Underhill, J., dissenting) (“[PJlaintiffs claim that the Parole Board based release decisions ‘solely on the basis of the violent nature of such offenses and thus without proper consideration to any other relevant or statutorily mandated factor.’ First Amended Compl. at ¶ 31.”). Consequently, although Bottom characterizes his parole decision as predetermined, the Board’s alleged policy of denying parole to violent felons — even if such a policy might constitute a violation of New York state law — is, for purposes of federal constitutional law, a permissible exercise of the Board’s discretion that “does not constitute egregious official conduct” and “does not, on its own, constitute a constitutional violation.” Id. at 116.

Finally, New York’s receipt of federal funding for implementing truth-in-sentencing laws, which require that violent felons serve eighty-five percent of their imposed sentences, see 42 U.S.C. § 13704(a)(1)(A), is not enough to transform the Board’s otherwise permissible policy of denying parole to violent felons into a constitutionally impermissible policy. Bottom did not allege that the Board’s members personally benefitted in any way from the funds, and Bottom does not argue that the Board’s alleged policy of considering only the severity of the crime was implemented differently in his parole hearings than was the policy we found to be permissible in Graziano. Any incentive of a Board official to deny parole that might result from New York’s receipt of federal funding is “too remote and attenuated,” *41 Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 1996), to constitute “egregious official conduct” given Bottom’s minimal due process rights in parole proceedings. 2 See Graziano, 689 F.3d at 116.

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Bottom’s due process claim.

2. Ex Post Facto Claim

Bottom’s complaint alleged that the Board’s policy of denying parole to violent felons effectively converted his life sentence with the possibility of parole into a life sentence without the possibility of parole in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, the Ex Post Facto Clause “applies only to legislative action that retroactively punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed.” Bar na, 239 F.3d at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Graziano, 689 F.3d at 117. It does not apply to laws, like those in New York’s statutory provisions concerning parole, that are “merely procedural and do[ ] not increase a prisoner’s punishment.” Barna, 239 F.3d at 171.

Bottom’s sole argument is that Bama and Graziano have been superseded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Peugh v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013). We disagree. Peugh held that there “is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines pro7 mulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense.” Id. at 2078. Peugh recognized that procedural hurdles in a sentencing regime, which “in practice[ ] make the imposition” of a more lenient sentence less likely, can constitute an ex post facto violation. Id. at 2083-84. But this recognition is consistent with our holding in Bama that “[a] law that is merely procedural and does not increase a prisoner’s punishment cannot violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Barna, 239 F.3d at 171 (emphasis added). Here, none of the Board’s alleged policy changes with respect to parole “increase [Bottom’s] punishment” because “[t]he New York parole scheme is not one that creates in any prisoner a legitimate expectancy of release” in the first place. Id. Although “the Ex Post Facto Clause does not merely protect reliance interests[,][i]t also reflects principles of fundamental justice,” the “principle of unfairness ... is not a doctrine unto itself’ that can “invali-dat[e] laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause by its own force.” Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2085 & n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bottom’s ex post facto claim was thus properly dismissed.

We have considered Bottom’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.