14‐2423 Lawrence v. Ramseur

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of June, two thousand fifteen.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________

DAVID LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

‐v.‐ No. 14‐2423

CRAIG RAMSEUR, individually and in his official capacity as Court Attorney Referee, WANDA WARDLAW MATTHEWS, individually and in her official capacity as Court Attorney Referee,

Defendants‐Appellees. ____________________________________________

FOR APPELLANT: David Lawrence, pro se, Valley Stream, NY. ____________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York (Kuntz, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and

hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐Appellant David Lawrence (“Lawrence”), proceeding pro se,

appeals from the District Court’s judgment sua sponte dismissing his

complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal.

Lawrence filed this action against two state court officials alleging that the

state court’s entry of a temporary order of protection against him violates his

constitutional rights and seeking the order’s dismissal and other related relief.

The District Court sua sponte dismissed his complaint, concluding that the

abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris,

(1971), deprived the

court of subject matter jurisdiction. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal

pursuant to

(e)(2). Giano v. Goord,

, 149–50 (2d Cir.

2 2001). Moreover, we are free to affirm a decision on any grounds supported in

the record, even if it is not one on which the District Court relied. Thyroff v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,

(2d Cir. 2006).

While a pro se complaint “must be construed liberally to raise the strongest

arguments it suggests,” it must nonetheless “state a plausible claim for relief.”

Walker v. Schult,

(2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009). Here, Lawrence fails to plausibly allege facts

sufficient to state a federal claim.1 Cf. Montero v. Travis,

(2d Cir.

1999); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

(2002). We have considered all of

Lawrence’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is

AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

1 In addition, Lawrence sporadically reargues points that he raised in a previous, related appeal. We dismissed that appeal, also pursuant to

(e), because “it lack[ed] an arguable basis in law or fact.” Lawrence v. Hoyos, No. 14‐959, Doc. No. 21 (2d Cir. June 20, 2014).

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