Gonzalez v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Gonzalez v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP

Opinion

14‐1583 Gonzalez v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of June, two thousand fifteen.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

SORAYA ROJAS GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. No. 14‐1583

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP, KEVIN MAGGERTY, KATHY ORTIZ, BARBARA SMITH, TYRA BOWENS,

Defendants‐Appellees.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: SORAYA ROJAS GONZALEZ, pro se, Forest Hills, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: LOUIS P. DILORENZO, Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC, New York, NY. _____________________________________

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Kuntz, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Appellant Soraya Rojas Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s judgment dismissing her Americans with Disabilities Act complaint. The

district court ruled that Gonzalez did not timely file a charge of discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and had not demonstrated

her entitlement to equitable tolling. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

2 We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, “construing the complaint

liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,

282 F.3d 147, 152

(2d Cir. 2002). Gonzalez does not argue that her administrative

charge was timely filed and has therefore abandoned any challenge to the district

court’s ruling that it was untimely. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown,

71 F.3d 88

,

92‐93 (2d Cir. 1995). We review the denial of equitable tolling for abuse of

discretion. See Zerilli‐Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,

333 F.3d 74, 81

(2d Cir.

2003).

Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial

of equitable tolling. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district

court in its thorough April 30, 2014, memorandum.

We have considered all of Gonzalez’s remaining arguments and find them

to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

3

Reference

Status
Unpublished