Xueyun Zheng v. Lynch

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Xueyun Zheng v. Lynch, 614 F. App'x 529 (2d Cir. 2015)

Xueyun Zheng v. Lynch

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Xueyun Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 13, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the April 9, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her applicatioñ for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. In re Xueyun Zheng, No. A200 892 654 (B.I.A. Dec. 13, 2013), aff'g No. A200 892 654 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 9, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Zheng does not argue that the agency erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of CAT relief; she argues only that there is pattern or practice of persecuting Roman Catholics in China and that the BIA therefore erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal.

To establish a- pattern or practice of persecution of a particular group, a petitioner must demonstrate that the harm to that group constitutes persecution, is perpetrated or tolerated by state actors, and is “so systemic or pervasive as to amount to a pattern or practice of persecution.” In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2007) (accepting the BIA’s standard as a reasonable one, while noting that it does not make clear *531 “how systemic, pervasive, or organized persecution must be before the Board would recognize it as a pattern or practice”).

Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s-determination that Zheng did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution against Catholics in China. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). If the agency “explicitly discussed the pattern or practice claim and the record includes substantial documentary evidence regarding the conditions in petitioner’s homeland, we are able to reach thé conclusion that the agency’s decision was not erroneous.” Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2009). The IJ explicitly addressed Zheng’s claim and found no pattern or practice of persecution of Catholics in China because, although the evidence showed continued repression of religion and harassment of church groups, that treatment varied by region and was not pervasive in Zheng’s home province of Fujian, and the most severe harm was reserved for church leaders. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 149-50, 159-60, 163-65. The 2009 U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Report on China discusses some destruction of underground churches and arrests of parishioners, but does not mention any incidents in Fujian province.

Zheng contends that the agency did not adequately consider evidence that some Catholics were arrested or assaulted in China. She cites in support of her claim record evidence that: some unregistered religious groups have been abolished and criminalized; officials in some areas detained Catholics who attended unregistered churches; and in 2005 in Fujian province Chinese authorities arrested and beat a Roman Catholic priest and his parishioners. That evidence, however, does not demonstrate systemic or pervasive persecution of Catholics either across China or in Fujian province. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Zheng had not shown a pattern or practice of persecution of Roman Catholics in China, and as a result is not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

Reference

Full Case Name
Xueyun ZHENG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Status
Unpublished