SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, *65 AND DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Brandon Mejias appeals pro se from a July 8, 2014 district court order denying his motion to modify his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Mejias pleaded guilty before the district court, pursuant to a plea agreement waiving his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence. The waiver was knowing and voluntary, and by its express terms barred any future collateral attacks upon his term of imprisonment if he was sentenced at or below 120 months’ imprisonment. He was sentenced to 87 months. While plea agreements are “applied narrowly and construed strictly against the Government,” United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to collaterally challenge a sentence is enforceable, see Tellado v. United States, 745 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2014).

Mejias asked the district court to reduce his sentence because, he contended, in imposing sentence the district court had failed to consider a policy statement within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). It is questionable whether such an application is permitted by § 3582(b)(1)(B), see United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barragan-Mendoza, 174 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1999); but even if such an application is permitted, that attack on the validity of the original sentence is precisely the sort of collateral attack' on a sentence that Mejias waived as part of his plea agreement. Because Meji-as’s motion was barred by his valid plea waiver, the district court did not err in denying it.

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.