SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Yuewen Feng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 4, 2013, decision of the BIA, affirming the October 19, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yuewen Feng, No. A095 941 034 (B.I.A. Dec. 4, 2013), aff'g No. A095 941 034 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 19, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this ease.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006)). The applicable § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). For asylum applications like Feng’s, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. The agency’s adverse credibility determination is based on substantial evidence.

The IJ reasonably relied on multiple discrepancies among Feng’s testimony, his asylum application, and his adjustment application, all of which called into question whether Feng was actually in China at the time of the alleged persecution. Feng’s asylum application listed him as living in China from his birth in 1969 until 2009 when he fled to the United States. But at his hearing, he acknowledged the falsity of that statement and testified that he first entered the United States' in December 1998, lived in Puerto Rico for five years, returned to China in 2004, and reentered the United States (without inspection) in 2009. When asked to explain, Feng first stated that a law firm filled out the application without his knowledge. Then, after admitting that he provided his background information to the firm, Feng stated he did not know why his asylum application omitted his five years in Puerto Rico. The IJ was entitled to rely on the discrepancy in making an adverse credibility determination, see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, and was not required to accept Feng’s explanation, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005).

Feng also testified that he applied for adjustment of status in Puerto Rico in 1998; however, Feng admitted that he denied ever filing for any immigration benefits during his interview with an asylum officer. Feng also admitted that his adjustment application itself contained false statements regarding when he entered Puerto Rico. Feng acknowledged that his application listed an earlier entry date in order to obtain the two years of residency necessary to adjust status, but at the same time insisted that he knew nothing about the adjustment application because it was filled out by another person. The IJ was not required to credit this attempt to shift the responsibility for false information. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. Because Feng admitted to lying on multiple occasions to obtain immigration benefits and because his false statements call into question his presence in China during the relevant periods, the IJ reasonably relied on the false statements to find Feng incredible. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, *50 170 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Accordingly, because all of Feng’s claims rely on his credibility, the agency did not err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because those claims were based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).