SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ali Ilyas, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of the BIA’s April 10, 2014, decision denying his motion to reopen. In re Ali Ilyas, No. A077 340 247 (B.I.A. Apr. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). When the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

Án applicant may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Ilyas’s motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it was his second motion and he filed it almost 10 years after his order of removal became final. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the limitations *85 do not apply where a motion is “based on changed .country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

It was not error for the agency to conclude that Ilyas failed to show a material change in country conditions between his asylum hearing and when he filed his motion to reopen. The evidence showed that pervasive sectarian violence in Pakistan existed in the years preceding Ilyas’s 2003 asylum hearing and continued at the time of his 2014 motion to reopen. See Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006)(establishing date of hearing as baseline for assessing whether evidence establishes changed conditions). Although the news articles and reports submitted by Ilyas suggested that violence may have increased over the years, it was not error to conclude that the recent evidence — even if it showed a marginal increase — was insufficient to constitute a material change in country conditions excusing the applicable procedural limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (B.I.A. 2007) (“Change that is incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory requirements” for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions).

Moreover, as the BIA observed, evidence of generalized sectarian violence in Pakistan was insufficient to show that Il-yas’s fears differed from the population as a whole. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1999) (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s well-founded fear of persecution.”). And the BIA was not required to find that Ilyas would be targeted for converting two people to Shia Islam because this assertion was found not credible in his underlying merits proceedings. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.