Doal v. Central Intelligence Agency
Doal v. Central Intelligence Agency
Opinion
SUMMARY ORDER
Jeanétte Doal appeals pro se from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint charging the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Justice with constitutional and human rights violations as a result of her being placed under surveillance by persons associated with the United States government as well as the terrorist group al Qaeda. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
District courts may dismiss a complaint sua sponte even where, as here, the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee, if the claim “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 819, 825, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995).
Although we have yet to decide whether a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to its inherent authority is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, the district court’s decision here “easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d at 364 n. 2. A review of the pleadings confirms the district court’s conclusion that Doal’s allegations lack rationality, so as to warrant sua sponte dismissal. Further, the district court properly denied Doal an opportunity to amend her complaint. Doal’s submissions to this Court merely reiterate her allegations in the district court, demonstrating that any amendment would have been futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
We have considered Doal’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.