SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Chassib Kassim Wahab, pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., and New York state law. The district court’s decision was based on Wahab’s failure to file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), his contractual waiver of claims, his failure to show that the non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action— rejection of his application to transfer to a new position because of his refusal to take a required test — was pretextual, and his failure to offer sufficient evidence to allow his remaining claims of disparate treatment and harassment to survive summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view *51 that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d.l57, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nón-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that (1) Wahab failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC, which rendered his federal claims time-barred; (2) he failed to carry his burden of showing that the non-discriminatory reason for the defendant’s failure to transfer him to the Melville facility was pretextual; and (3) he failed to produce evidence as to his other, indeterminate disparate treatment and harassment claims sufficient to survive summary judgment. As to these grounds for dismissal, we affirm for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s well-reasoned and thorough report and recommendation, adopted in its entirety by the district court. Because we do so, we need not determine whether Wahab’s contractual waiver of claims was in fact knowing and voluntary, and therefore provided an independent basis for dismissal of the action.

We have considered all of Wahab’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.