14‐2249‐pr Watts v. Griffin

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand fifteen. 4 5 PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 8 Circuit Judges. 9 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 10 KEVIN E. WATTS, 11 12 Petitioner‐Appellant, 13 v. 14‐2249 14 15 SUPERINTENDENT P. GRIFFIN, 16 17 Respondent‐Appellee. 18 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 19 FOR PETITIONER‐APPELLANT: Kevin E. Watts, pro se, 20 Napanoch, NY 21 22 FOR RESPONDENT‐APPELLEE: Leonard Joblove, Camille O’Hara

1 1 Gillespie, Gamaliel Marrero, 2 Assistant District Attorneys, for 3 Kenneth P. Thompson, District 4 Attorney, Kings County, 5 Brooklyn, NY 6 7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

8 District of New York (Allyne R. Ross, Judge).

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

10 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is

11 AFFIRMED.

12 Appellant Kevin Watts, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District

13 Court’s judgment dismissing his

petition. We assume the

14 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on

15 appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

16 “A State’s procedural rules serve vital purposes at trial, on appeal, and on

17 state collateral attack” and “channel[], to the extent possible, the resolution of

18 various types of questions to the stage of the judicial process at which they can be

19 resolved most fairly and efficiently.” Coleman v. Thompson,

, 749

20 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[f]ederal courts considering

21 habeas corpus petitions are generally barred from reviewing the decisions of state

2 1 courts insofar as those decisions are predicated on adequate and independent

2 state procedural grounds.” Messiah v. Duncan,

(2d Cir. 2006).

3 Federal habeas review is not available if the State court “clearly and expressly”

4 holds that its judgment rests upon a State procedural bar, even if it “addresses the

5 merits in reaching an alternative holding.” Whitley v. Ercole,

, 286 &

6 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

7 Here, the State court reviewing Watts’s motion to vacate his conviction

8 under Section 440.10 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law ruled that Watts

9 failed to properly raise his claims on direct appeal and, in the alternative, held

10 that his claims lacked merit. The District Court properly concluded that the State

11 court had ruled on an independent and adequate state ground and that it was

12 barred from reaching the merits of Watts’s claims. See Clark v. Perez,

(2d Cir. 2008); Murden v. Artuz,

, 191‐92 (2d Cir. 2007).

14 We have considered all of Watts’s remaining arguments and conclude that

15 they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

16 Court is AFFIRMED.

17 FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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