SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Adam Miller appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Buchwald, J.), granting defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss the complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Miller challenges the ruling that his allegations of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 1985(3) fail to state a claim. 1 Plaintiff claims (1) that he was retaliated against for exercising his free speech rights, (2) that the discipline he faced was not imposed on other teachers in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and (3) that his procedural and substantive due process rights were violated. The claims are wholly without merit.

1. “Whether public employee speech is protected from retaliation under the First Amendment entails two inquiries: (1) “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern’ and, if so, (2) “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.’” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter *39 of public concern is a question of law for the court to decide, taking into account the content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the whole record. The heart of the matter is whether the employee’s speech was calculated to redress personal grievances or whether it had a broader public purpose.” Ruotolo, 514 F.3d at 189 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs retaliation claim fails because the speech alleged did not address a matter of public concern and was focused entirely on defendants’ treatment of the plaintiff alone. Plaintiff argues that his allegations reveal public wrongdoing or corruption and thus are matters of public concern. However, unlike a typical public corruption case with broad impact, the only victim of defendants’ alleged actions here is the plaintiff himself. See Id. at 190 (“A generalized public interest in the fair or proper treatment of public employees is not enough.”). Because the speech that forms the core of the plaintiffs retaliation claim does not address a matter of public concern, the claim fails.

2. Plaintiff alleges his equal protection rights were violated; but “the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the Clause under a ‘class of one’ theory.” Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 605-09, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008)). Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a protected group; rather, the equal protection claim amounts to a theory that Miller was unfairly “singled out” for discipline that was not visited on other teacher's who were similarly situated. Because the equal protection claim rests on a “class of one” theory, it fails.

3. Plaintiff proposes novel legal theories to suggest that his due process rights were violated both procedurally and substantively.

a. Plaintiff alleges that his procedural due process rights were violated when defendants did not adhere to the various “procedures, policies, rules and regulations and contractual provisions in a fair and even-handed manner and without regard to personal motives.” Appellant’s Brief at 63. To state a procedural due process claim, plaintiff must allege a property right with a source other than the Constitution, such as a state or federal statute. O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005), To invoke procedural due process, a plaintiff must seek “to protect something more than an ordinary contractual right.” S & D Maint. Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir. 1988). “Rather, procedural protection is sought in connection with a state’s revocation of a status, an estate ... [such as] tenure.” Id. If such a property right is found, we must determine whether that property right “constitutes a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005).

Plaintiff does not complain of a revocation of tenure. Rather, he asserts that he had a property interest in certain specific disciplinary procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement. Such “ordinary contractual right[s],” S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 966, do not constitute property interests. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for procedural due process violations.

b. Plaintiff alleges that the uneven enforcement of contractual rights also violated his substantive due process rights. However, “where a specific constitutional provision prohibits government action, plaintiffs seeking redress for that prohibited conduct in a § 1983 suit cannot make *40 reference to the broad notion of substantive due process.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). “For a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, it must allege governmental conduct that ‘is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the. contemporary conscience.’ ” Id. at 93-94 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)).

All of the plaintiffs substantive due process allegations are subsumed by allegations that the same conduct violated other, more specific, constitutional provisions, i.e., retaliation for protected speech and the equal protection clause. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 94 (“[W]hat would serve to raise defendant’s actions beyond the wrongful to the unconscionable and shocking are facts which, if proven, would constitute, in themselves, specific constitutional violations.”). But even if his allegations were not duplicitous, nothing about the plaintiffs workplace grievances or offended feelings “shocks the conscience.” Accordingly, plaintiffs substantive due process claims fail.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in plaintiffs other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.