SUMMARY ORDER

Martin Weinstein, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

‘We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013) (per cu-riam). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, that requirement is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

As the district court determined, Wein-stein’s federal claims are time barred. Weinstein does not contend that his complaint was timely; rather, he argues that the statutes of limitation should have been equitably tolled because the defendants prevented him from accessing emails that would have provided factual support for his claims.

Equitable tolling is available in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying equitable tolling. *46 Weinstein was aware of the injuries underlying his causes of action as soon as he resigned, and actively litigated claims based on these same facts in state court. See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is well established that a district court may rely on matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)....”).

Weinstein has not alleged that the' defendants concealed his causes , of action, but that he was prevented from accessing certain evidence. Fraudulent concealment doctrine excuses a plaintiffs late filing of a complaint if the defendants concealed the cause of action itself. See Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 2004); Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2002). Weinstein confuses the “distinction between fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action and fraudulent concealment of facts that, if known, would enhance a plaintiffs ability to prevail as to a cause of action of which the plaintiff was previously aware.” See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 84. Therefore, Weinstein’s excuse for his delay — that the defendants concealed emails that would have provided factual support for his claims — does not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting tolling, Cf. Brown v. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (Soto-mayor, J.); Miller v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985).

Weinstein’s motions to supplement the record on appeal are denied. “Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court will not enlarge the record on appeal to include evidentiary material not presented to the district court.” Okoi v. El Al Israel Airlines, 378 Fed.Appx. 9, 11 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citing Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1975)). Weinstein has not alleged any extraordinary circumstance warranting our consideration of the new evidence he seeks to submit.

We have considered Weinstein’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Wein-stein’s motions to supplement the record are DENIED;