Qui Ji Rui v. Lynch

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Qui Ji Rui v. Lynch, 636 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2016)

Qui Ji Rui v. Lynch

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Qui Ji Rui, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a November 22, 2013, decision of the BIA, affirming the June 6, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Qui Ji Rui, No. A201 155 005 (B.I.A. Nov. 22, 2013), aff'g No. A201 155 005 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 6, -2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

For asylum applications like Rui’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements and other record evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). ‘We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, *24 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

First, the agency reasonably found inconsistent Rui’s statement in his asylum application that his father is a Christian, his testimony that his father is not a Christian, and his witness’s testimony that his father is a Christian. The agency further reasonably found inconsistent his application, testimony, and mother’s letter regarding where his brothers reside and whether they were arrested on account of their religion in China. See id. at 166 n. 3, 167. Rui failed to provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for •inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

The IJ also reasonably found it implausible that the police immediately discovered Rui’s identity and home address after an attempted raid on a Christian gathering he attended. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that an implausibility finding that is based on “speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.”). Rui testified that he had not previously attended such a gathering, did not know most of the members in attendance, and had never been arrested or involved in any underground church activity. Having questioned Rui’s credibility, the agency reasonably-relied further on his failure to provide certain credible evidence corroborating his claim or rehabilitating his testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Given the inconsistency, implausibility, and corroboration findings, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. That determination is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal, as those claims are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

Reference

Full Case Name
QUI JI RUI, AKA Ji Rui Qui, AKA Ji Rui, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Status
Unpublished