SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner-Cross-Respondent National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) seeks enforcement of its order. Respondent-Cross-Petitioner American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. (“AMR”) seeks review of that order. The NLRB’s order requires AMR to, among other things, cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor practices and to offer to reinstate employee and union steward Adam Cummings, who was discharged as a result of his activities on behalf of a labor union.

Our review of an NLRB order is “highly deferential.” Int'l Union, UAW v. NLRB, 520 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2008). We “must enforce the Board’s order where its legal conclusions are reasonably based, and its factual findings are supported by substan *41 tial evidence on the record as a whole.” NLRB v. Katz’s Delicatessen of Houston St., Inc., 80 F.3d 755, 763 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, we may not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even [if we] would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before [us] de novo.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).

On appeal to this Court, AMR did not contest, inter alia, the Board’s findings that it violated sections 8(a)(5) and .(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) by unilaterally changing its procedures to require that employees check the levels of certain fluids in their vehicles and complete a checklist certifying they had inspected the vehicle. Further, AMR did not contest the Board’s finding that AMR violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by disciplining employees pursuant to the new procedures. Therefore, “[t]he Board is entitled to summary affirmance of portions of its order identifying or remedying these and all other uncontested violations of the Act.” NLRB v. Consol. Bus Transit, Inc., 577 F.3d 467, 474 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2009).

Substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Board’s conclusion that AMR violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging employee and union steward Adam Cummings as a result of his protected activity as a union steward. While AMR asserts that the NLRB ignored evidence of Cummings’s misconduct, specifically that Cummings intentionally attempted to incite a work stoppage, we will not displace the NLRB’s decision because it is adequately supported by the record. See NLRB v. G & T Terminal Packaging Co., 246 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2001).

AMR also challenges the Board’s decision to affirm the denial of AMR’s motion to defer Cummings’s complaint to arbitration. Where a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, there is ordinarily a presumption in favor of arbitration. See United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558-59 (1984); see also Collyer Insulated Wire, Gulf & W. Sys. Co., 192 NLRB 837, 841-42 (1971). However, it is within the Board’s discretion to refuse to defer to arbitration, see Lodges 700, 743, 1746, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1975), particularly where the “interests of the union are [] contrary to those of the affected employee[,]” Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, I.B.T. v. Reg’l Imp. & Exp. Trucking Co., 944 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 558-60). Here, the record supported the Board’s determination that there was significant hostility of the union representative toward Cummings. Accordingly, the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in denying AMR’s motion.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in AMR’s other arguments, we hereby GRANT the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order and DENY AMR’s cross-petition for review.