SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Ajamu Uwadiegwu appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.) dismissing his complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.

“A district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 294 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “[W]e may affirm an appealed decision ‘on any ground which finds support in the record, regardless of the ground upon which the trial court relied.’” Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 75 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Reid v. Senkowski, 961 F.2d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1992)).

Uwadiegwu argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in visitation rights with his children. The children have been removed from his custody, and he has been granted monitored visitation rights. However, he claims that defendants interfered with those rights by aiding the mother in moving the children to Mississippi. He claims that this interfered with his visitation rights, violating his procedural and substantive due process rights.

Uwadiegwu’s claim fails even if we assume that he has such a liberty interest, an issue we have never resolved, but on which some courts have ruled in his favor. See, e.g., Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006); Prisco v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) overruled on other grounds by Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C.Cir. 1983) supplemented, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C.Cir. 1983); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F.Supp. 949, 952 (W.D.Mo. 1982) aff'd sub nom. Ruffalo by Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983); Sullivan v. Shaw, 437 Pa.Super. 534, 650 A.2d 882, 884 (1994); cf. also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005).

First, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Uwadieg-wu’s procedural due process claim. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2007)). Uwadiegwu appears to argue that he was entitled to notice and a hearing before defendants interfered with his visitation rights. We have previously explained, however, that “[tjhere is no authority for the proposition that ... a non-custodial parent ha[s] a clearly established right to a pre-termination hearing before suspension of whatever visitation rights she might have,” Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998), and Uwadiegwu fails to identify any intervening change in the law that would alter that conclusion.

Second, Uwadiegwu’s procedural due process claim against defendants Department of Social Services of the County of Suffolk (“DSS”) and the County of Suffolk (the “County”) fail because he does not offer any factual allegations that could give rise to municipal liability. “[A] mu *16 nicipality can be held hable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). “Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee.” Id. Here, Uwadiegwu’s allegations that DSS (he says nothing about the County) has a policy and practice of discriminating against fathers, African Americans, disabled persons, and impoverished persons are entirely conclusory and cannot save his complaint from dismissal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclu-sory statements, do not suffice.”).

Third, Uwadiegwu’s complaint does not allege government misconduct that rises to the level of a substantive due process violation. “To state a claim for a violation of th[e] substantive due process right of custody, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state action depriving him of custody was ‘so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.’” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 600 (2d Cir. 1999)). We see no reason to apply a different standard to visitation-based claims. Here, Uwadiegwu’s complaint and the documents incorporated therein reveal that Uwadiegwu had been accused of abusing his children’s mother and that defendants helped Uwadiegwu’s children and their mother move to Mississippi after the children were removed from Uwadiegwu’s care because of neglect. Simply put, defendants’ conduct under these circumstances does not shock our conscience. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 787 F.2d 403, 408 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t does not shock our conscience or otherwise offend our judicial notions of fairness to hear that caseworkers responsible for an allegedly abused child arranged for the child to be examined by a psychologist and, after receiving confirmation of child abuse, reduced the parents’ visitation rights and permitted the child to remain with her foster parent when the foster parent moved out of the parents’ geographical area.”).

We have considered all of Uwadiegwu’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.