SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Marcia Pearson appeals pro se the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), which decision we review de novo, see Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

The district court correctly determined that Pearson failed to establish diversity jurisdiction because she is a citizen of New York and named a New York citizen, Elizabeth Downer, as a defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Herrick Co. v. SCS Commc’ns, Inc., 251 F.3d 315, 325 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that diversity statute mandates complete diversity). Nevertheless, in light of the solicitude accorded pro se litigants, courts “should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the com- . plaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). • We have specifically permitted plaintiffs to amend complaints “to drop dispensable nondi-verse defendants whose presence would defeat diversity of citizenship.” Jaser v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 815 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1987). Because Pearson could have invoked diversity jurisdiction in an action against only defendant Sarah Reid-Robinson, a Georgia citizen, the district court needed to determine whether Downer was an indispensable party before dismissing Pearson’s complaint without leave to amend. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1); Jaser v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 815 F.2d at 243 (stating that failure to consider whether nondi- *20 verse party was indispensable amounted to abuse of discretion). 1

We have considered Pearson’s remaining arguments, including her assertion of federal question jurisdiction, and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing Pearson’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but we VACATE the judgment insofar as it failed to afford Pearson leave to amend without a finding of futility, and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.