SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Leandro Reinerio Terreros-Terreros, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks, review of a March 29, 2013, decision of the BIA, affirming the April 11, 2012, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Leandro Reinerio Terreros-Terreros, No. A089 013 405 (B.I.A. Mar. 29, 2013), aff'g No. A089 013 405 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Apr. 11, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applica *105 ble standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chen, 417 F.3d at 271.

A. Asylum

Terreros-Terreros fails to challenge the agency’s ■pretermission of his asylum application as untimely in his brief to this Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005) (issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived). Accordingly, he has waived any challenge to the agency’s denial of asylum.

B. Withholding of Removal and CAT

Here, the IJ found that, even if Terreros-Terreros had been able to establish past persecution on account of a protected ground, his claim would fail because he could safely relocate within Ecuador as he had lived in Quito for a month without incident. The agency’s regulations provide that “an immigration judge ... shall deny the asylum application of an alien found to be a refugee on the basis of past persecution if ... [t]he applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s countiy of nationality ... and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(i); see also Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA found that Terreros-Ter-reros failed to challenge this dispositive finding on appeal.

We have never held that a petitioner is limited to the “exact contours” of his argument to the agency. Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). On the contrary, we have held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(d)(1) does not prevent us from considering “specific, subsidiary legal arguments, or arguments by extension,” even if those arguments were not presented below. Gill, 420 F.3d at 86; see Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 633 n. 10 (2d Cir. 2004); Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 112 n. 19 (2d Cir,2003). In determining which arguments constitute “issues,” which must be exhausted, and which constitute “subsidiary arguments,” which do not, we examine whether an unexhausted argument “constitutes a ground, in and of itself, on which an IJ’s denial of [relief] may be based.” See Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 117-118 (2d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, when a petitioner fails to challenge the IJ’s finding that he could relocate safely within his country, we decline to consider that unex-hausted argument because, on its own, internal relocation is a proper basis for a denial of relief. Id.

Here, Terreros-Terreros argued before the BIA that he “could not escape” participating in the gang, “could not secure any protection from the Ecuadorian government,” and noted that there was widespread “corruption within the country.” Terreros-Terreros also stated in the conclusion that he was “unable and unwilling to return” to Ecuador because of his fear. The BIA reasonably deemed these statements insufficient to challenge the IJ’s internal relocation finding.

In addition, the BIA found that Terreros-Terreros failed to challenge the denial of CAT relief in his counseled brief, and deemed it waived. Thus, as a statutory matter, we are without jurisdiction to consider any challenge to the denial of CAT relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any *106 pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).