SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Theodore Simpson, a prisoner in the custody of New York’s Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, appeals pro se from a summary judgment award in favor of defendants Benjamin Oakes, Catherine Felker, Howard Silverberg, David Karandy, and Janet Collins on Simpson’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We review an award of summary judgment de novo and will affirm only if the record, viewed in favor of the non-moving party, demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

To defeat summary judgment, Simpson was obliged to adduce evidence that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). This standard consists of both objective and subjective components, “Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in *88 the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Subjectively, the charged official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., “something more than mere negligence” and akin to criminal recklessness. Id.; accord Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006).

Applying these principles here, we conclude that the district court correctly awarded summary judgment to Oakes, Felker, Silverberg, Karandy, and Collins for substantially the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Peebles’s August 21, 2014 report and recommendation (“R & R”). See Simpson v. Oakes, No. 9:12-CV-1482 (GTS/DEP), 2015 WL 339408 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015) (adopted R & R). 1 Against defendants’ detailed declarations and Simpson’s own voluminous medical records, Simpson identifies no evidence of deliberate indifference giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact to be decided at trial. To the contrary, the record establishes that defendants provided Simpson with extensive medical care. Insofar as Simpson disagrees with defendants’ medical judgment as to the proper course of treatment, that does not support a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2003). 2

Tolan v. Cotton, —U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014), cited by Simpson, compels no different result. To-lan emphasizes a court’s duty to view evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, see id. at 1866, a rule we follow with particular solicitude for pro se litigants, see Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006). But even a pro se litigant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment through mere allegations or conclusory statements unsupported by facts. See Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). Nor can Simpson compensate for his failure to challenge defendants’ N.D.N.Y. Local R. 7.1 statement of facts — particularly after being given notice of the consequences— by attempting to supplement the record on appeal. Cf. Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996).

Simpson’s ‘ additional challenges also lack merit. The partial denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Simpson v. Rodas, No. 10 CV-6670 (CS), 2012 WL 4354832, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012), did not preclude their later Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, which followed discovery and tested whether that process yielded sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact. Cf EDP Med. Comput. Sys. Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that application of res judicata requires “final judgment on the merits” (emphasis added)). Nor are Simpson’s “mere bald assertions” regarding the substance of his claim sufficient to render the district court’s refusal to appoint counsel an abuse of its “[bjroad discretion” in this regard, Hodge v. Police *89 Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986); accord Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 2010), given its careful consideration of the many factors governing this determination, see Decision and Order at 3-4, Simpson v. Oakes, No. 9:12— CV-1482 (GTS/DEP) (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), ECF No. 126.

We have considered Simpson’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.