SUMMARY ORDER

In these consolidated cases, Defendants-Appellants Demetrius Sullivan and Jarrell Williams 1 pleaded guilty to a single-count indictment charging them with conspiring to engage in racketeering activities in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The charges were based on conduct arising from the defendants’ membership in the “Bricktown Gang,” a group known for distributing large amounts of cocaine and crack cocaine and for engaging in murder, robbery, and other acts of violence in Syracuse, New York. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented on appeal.

Sullivan contends that his counsel was ineffective by failing meaningfully to advocate on his behalf during the sentencing proceedings, including by not re-raising mitigating arguments from her sentencing memorandum after withdrawing certain objections to the PSR and by not arguing for a downward departure based on sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine. “When faced with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we may [] decline to hear the claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. Morgan, 386 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). We are “generally disinclined to resolve ineffective assistance claims on direct review.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 467 (2d Cir. 2004). *57 We decline to decide Sullivan’s ineffective assistance claims, leaving him to raise these claims in a collateral proceeding.

For his part, Williams claims that his sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment was substantively unreasonable due to the mitigating factors in this case, including his youth and involuntary immersion in gang culture, the hardship that will be suffered by Williams’ young son, who was born while he was in custody, and the deep remorse he has shown. Williams further argues that the sentence imposed fails to further the sentencing goal of rehabilitation. “A sentencing judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual offender and a particular crime.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). We will “set aside a district court’s substantive détermination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)).

We conclude that Williams’ sentence was substantively reasonable. In imposing a mid-Guidelines sentence of 420 months, the district court balanced the mitigating factors cited by Williams against his “egregious conduct,” J.A. 101, in murdering Anthony Ford and randomly shooting at other members of the community, and also noted the devastating impact of Williams’ actions on his victims and their families. In light of these facts, we cannot say that the sentence was “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009).

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.