14‐110‐cv Kampfer v. Cuomo

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of March, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

DOUGLAS E. KAMPFER, Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. 14‐110‐cv

ANDREW M. CUOMO (Governor, State of New York), Defendant‐Appellee.

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Douglas E. Kampfer, pro se, Mayfield, New York.

FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: Claude S. Platton, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, New York.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York (Sharpe, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Douglas E. Kampfer, proceeding pro se, appeals a

January 7, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York dismissing Kampferʹs various constitutional challenges to the New York

Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (the ʺSAFE Actʺ) pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his remaining state law claim. See

(McKinney)

(codified as amended at scattered sections of N.Y. Penal Law). Kampfer alleges both a

facial Second Amendment challenge to the SAFE Actʹs assault weapons restrictions and

an equal protection challenge to its grandfather clause. He also moves for sanctions

against counsel for defendant‐appellee for stating, in a caption in an affidavit, that a

motion was unopposed when it was opposed. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with

the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district courtʹs dismissal of a complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the

‐ 2 ‐ complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffʹs favor. See

Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2010).

Neither of Kampferʹs constitutional challenges is persuasive. First,

Kampferʹs facial Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed by our decision in New

York State Rifle & Pistol Assʹn, Inc. v. Cuomo (ʺNYSPRAʺ), where we upheld the

constitutionality of the SAFE Actʹs restrictions on assault weapons.

, 261‐63

(2d Cir. 2015).

Second, Kampferʹs equal protection challenge to the SAFE Actʹs

grandfather clause also lacks merit. Kampfer contends that, because the SAFE Act

provides exemptions for pre‐existing owners of assault weapons, he has not been

treated the same as those otherwise similarly situated individuals. See

(describing SAFE Actʹs grandfather clause). This challenge is subject to rational basis

review because the provision neither targets a suspect class, nor, for the reasons set

forth in NYSPRA, 804 F.3d at 261‐63, unconstitutionally burdens Second Amendment

rights. See Kwong v. Bloomberg,

, 170 n.19 (2d Cir. 2013) (when statute

ʺsurvives ʹintermediate scrutiny,ʹ and . . . does not involve a suspect classification . . .

courts have applied ʹrational basisʹ review to Equal Protection claimsʺ (citation

omitted)). Grandfather clauses are a long‐accepted legislative tool for mitigating the

effect of new regulations on persons who have relied on existing law. See City of New

‐ 3 ‐ Orleans v. Dukes,

, 304‐05 (1976). Here, the grandfather clause seeks to

mitigate the effects of the SAFE Act on pre‐existing owners, and was not irrational.

We have reviewed Kampferʹs remaining arguments and conclude they are

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, and

Kampferʹs motion for sanctions is denied.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk

‐ 4 ‐