14‐110‐cv Kampfer v. Cuomo UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of March, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x DOUGLAS E. KAMPFER, Plaintiff‐Appellant, v. 14‐110‐cv ANDREW M. CUOMO (Governor, State of New York), Defendant‐Appellee. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Douglas E. Kampfer, pro se, Mayfield, New York.

FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: Claude S. Platton, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, New York.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Douglas E. Kampfer, proceeding pro se, appeals a January 7, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissing Kampferʹs various constitutional challenges to the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (the ʺSAFE Actʺ) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claim. See 2013 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1 (McKinney) (codified as amended at scattered sections of N.Y. Penal Law). Kampfer alleges both a facial Second Amendment challenge to the SAFE Actʹs assault weapons restrictions and an equal protection challenge to its grandfather clause. He also moves for sanctions against counsel for defendant‐appellee for stating, in a caption in an affidavit, that a motion was unopposed when it was opposed. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district courtʹs dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the

‐ 2 ‐ complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffʹs favor. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2010).

Neither of Kampferʹs constitutional challenges is persuasive. First, Kampferʹs facial Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed by our decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assʹn, Inc. v. Cuomo (ʺNYSPRAʺ), where we upheld the constitutionality of the SAFE Actʹs restrictions on assault weapons. 804 F.3d 242, 261‐63 (2d Cir. 2015).

Second, Kampferʹs equal protection challenge to the SAFE Actʹs grandfather clause also lacks merit. Kampfer contends that, because the SAFE Act provides exemptions for pre‐existing owners of assault weapons, he has not been treated the same as those otherwise similarly situated individuals. See id. at 249 (describing SAFE Actʹs grandfather clause). This challenge is subject to rational basis review because the provision neither targets a suspect class, nor, for the reasons set forth in NYSPRA, 804 F.3d at 261‐63, unconstitutionally burdens Second Amendment rights. See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 170 n.19 (2d Cir. 2013) (when statute ʺsurvives ʹintermediate scrutiny,ʹ and . . . does not involve a suspect classification . . . courts have applied ʹrational basisʹ review to Equal Protection claimsʺ (citation omitted)). Grandfather clauses are a long‐accepted legislative tool for mitigating the effect of new regulations on persons who have relied on existing law. See City of New

‐ 3 ‐ Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304‐05 (1976). Here, the grandfather clause seeks to mitigate the effects of the SAFE Act on pre‐existing owners, and was not irrational.

We have reviewed Kampferʹs remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, and Kampferʹs motion for sanctions is denied.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk

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