SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Omar Chukwueze, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment, in which it dismissed in part and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee New York City Employees’ Retirement System with respect to his Title VII claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment de' novo. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). The burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to Chukwueze’s claims for retaliation and wrongful termination. See Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014).

To make a prima facie showing of retaliation,

a plaintiff must submit sufficient admissible evidence to allow a trier of fact to *65 find: (i) conduct by the plaintiff that is protected activity under Title VII; (ii) of which the employer was aware; (iii) followed by an adverse employment action of a nature that would deter a reasonable employee from making or supporting a discrimination claim; (iv) that was causally connected to the protected activity.

Cox v. Onondaga Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2014). Informal complaints may constitute protected activity. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2002). However, for a complaint to constitute activity protected by Title VII, it may not be so “generalized” that the employer “could not reasonably have understood that [the plaintiff] was complaining of conduct prohibited by Title VII.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the admissible evidence establishes that Chukwueze complained only generally about his treatment. Moreover, Chukwueze has not proffered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that, but-for his complaints, he would not have been terminated. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013).

To make a prima facie showing of wrongful termination, “a plaintiff must show that he (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) was discharged; and that (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of his membership in the protected class.” Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] dismissal.” Id. “If such a reason is proffered, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.” Id. Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Chukwueze was fired for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason: he submitted a false overtime sheet and was fired shortly thereafter. Chukwueze has not submitted sufficient evidence to carry his burden of providing that he was fired for a discriminatory reason. 1

Finally, Chukwueze has abandoned any claims not raised in his brief. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that pro, se appellant abandoned issue by failing to raise it in his appellate brief).

We have considered Chukwueze’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.