14‐3869‐cv Spratt v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

RONALD SPRATT, Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. 14‐3869‐cv

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., Defendant‐Appellee.

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: RONALD SPRATT, pro se, Albany, New York.

FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: MATTHEW T. MIKLAVE, Ian T. Clarke‐Fisher, Robinson & Cole LLP, New York, New York.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Nathan, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Ronald Spratt, proceeding pro se, appeals the judgment

of the district court entered September 22, 2014 in favor of defendant‐appellee Verizon

Communications Inc. (ʺVerizonʺ), dismissing his claims of discrimination and retaliation

in violation of

. By Memorandum and Order entered September 17,

2014, the district court granted Verizonʹs motion for summary judgment. Spratt also

challenges the district courtʹs September 17, 2013 denial of leave to amend the complaint

for a third time to add a party. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying

facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the district courtʹs grant of summary judgment, with the

view that ʺ[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is ʹno genuine dispute as to

any material factʹ and the moving party is ʹentitled to judgment as a matter of law.ʹʺ

Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Commʹn,

(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non‐movant. Gould v. Winstar Commcʹns, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate ʺ[w]here the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non‐moving party.ʺ

2 Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund,

(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hayes

v. New York City Depʹt of Corr.,

, 619 (2d Cir. 1996)). A district courtʹs decision

to deny leave to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Loreley Fin.

(Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC,

(2d Cir. 2015).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that

Sprattʹs discrimination claim failed as a matter of law because he was unable to raise an

inference of discriminatory intent in connection with his termination. The only direct

evidence of racially discriminatory animus ‐‐ a pair of racist remarks made by Sprattʹs

supervisor, Emilio Acevedo, a year and a half before the events in question ‐‐ do not raise

such an inference because the remarks were too remote from, and unrelated to, the

decision‐making process that resulted in Sprattʹs termination. Nor did Spratt present

indirect or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that

discrimination was a motivating factor in his discharge.

Likewise, the district court correctly determined that the record contained

insufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to retaliation. The district court

correctly identified Sprattʹs retaliation claim as a ʺcatʹs pawʺ theory of liability, meaning

that he sought to hold Verizon liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not

ultimately responsible for the employment decision. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,

, 421‐22 (2011) (accepting the validity of catʹs paw analysis in the context of

employment discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and

3 Reemployment Rights Act of 1994). A supervisorʹs retaliatory actions must be the

ʺbut‐forʺ cause of the employerʹs adverse employment action. See Vega v. Hempstead

Union Free Sch. Dist.,

(2d Cir. 2015) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.

Nassar,

(2013)) (discussing retaliation in the context of Title VII); see

also Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse,

(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that substantive

legal principles for claims under Title VII also apply to claims under § 1981). Although

the district court held that Spratt had failed to establish proximate cause between

Acevedoʹs allegedly false report of the January 14 telephone conversation and Sprattʹs

termination, application of the proper but‐for standard only buttresses the courtʹs

conclusion as it eliminates the need to weigh the relative impact of Acevedoʹs allegedly

false report.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sprattʹs

post hoc motion to amend his complaint to re‐add Acevedo as a party two years after he

had stipulated to Acevedoʹs dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the

reasons stated in the district courtʹs well‐reasoned and thorough orders.

Additionally, Sprattʹs contention that he was the victim of disability

discrimination will not be considered because it is raised for the first time on appeal.

See Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Citta del Vaticano,

(2d Cir. 2013).

4 We have considered all of Sprattʹs remaining arguments and find them to

be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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