SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants-appellants Aaron Rabinowitz and Matthew Burstein appeal from judgments entered on September 9, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, /.), convicting them, after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, seven counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Rabinowitz and Burstein were both sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Rabinowitz and Burstein argue that they were entitled to certain Internal Revenue Service tax transcripts to impeach cooperating witness Barbara Armas, that the transcripts prove that Armas committed perjury about seeking extensions to file her tax returns, and that the district eourt erroneously denied a new trial premised on these arguments.-

Defendants also assert that the district court erred in dénying their motion to dismiss the indictment based on allegations of outrageous government misconduct by a former case agent involved in the investigation. They further fault the district court for failing to hold a hearing to address this misconduct claim.

1. “[T]he Government’s failure to disclose evidence that is materially favorable to the defense violates due process.” United, States v. Rivas, 377 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Brady’s scope includes impeachment evidence if it has “the potential to alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness.” Rivas, 377 F.3d at 199. “Undisclosed impeachment evidence is not material in the Brady sense when, although possibly useful to the defense, it is not likely to have changed the verdict.” United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

*65 Defendants argue that the withholding of evidence warrants a new trial; however, the evidence was not material. There was no reasonable likelihood that any false testimony about extension requests would have affected the verdict.

The tax transcripts were of only incremental value. The defense extensively questioned Armas on her participation in the mortgage fraud, her post-guilty plea misconduct, her cooperation agreement with the government, her failure to file tax returns, and the continuing benefits she derived from the properties she obtained through her mortgage fraud, among other misconduct.

As the district court found, proof that she may not have sought an extension to file her taxes was merely additional impeachment evidence, and any unavailability of the material to the defense did not require a new trial.

Further supporting the rejection of defendants’ Brady/Giglio challenge is the extensive record evidence corroborating Armas’s testimony and independently implicating defendants in the crimes of conviction. Such independent evidence of guilt “increases the degree of significance that would need to be ascribed to the withheld impeachment evidence in order for it reasonably to undermine confidence in the verdict.” United States v. Orena, 145 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Leka v. Porbuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256-57.

2. This Court reviews de novo the legal question whether to dismiss an indictment based on outrageous government misconduct. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991). To establish a due process violation on this ground, “a defendant must show that the government’s conduct is ‘so outrageous that common notions of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a conviction.’ ” United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997)). “[T]he sanction is so drastic that, especially where serious criminal conduct is involved, it must be reserved for the truly extreme cases.” United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979).

In Cuervelo, this Court considered whether a hearing was required to determine whether a government agent’s sexual relationship with a defendant violated due process:

[A]t a minimum, the defendant must show: (1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed; (2) that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and (3) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged therein.

949 F.2d at 567. Here, the government agent had a sexual relationship with a confidential witness. The agent’s involvement did not impact the defendants’ prosecution to any significant degree. 1

Nothing about the agent’s conduct in this case implicates the factors identified in Cuervelo: sex was not used as a weapon, was not acquiesced in by the Government, was not conducted to achieve governmental ends, and it did not take place *66 during or close to the period covered by the indictment. In short, the conduct fails to rise to the level of being “so outrageous that common notions of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain such a conviction.” Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 121. Accordingly, no hearing to further develop the facts was necessary. See United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Nothing in Cueruelo requires a district court to conduct a hearing every time a defendant alleges .outrageous government misconduct.”).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in defendants’ other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.