SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Neil Johnson stands convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846, for which he received a 320-month imprisonment sentence. Johnson appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We review a determination that a defendant is ineligible for a sentencing reduction de novo. See United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

In arguing that he was eligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782, Johnson maintains that the district court (1) erroneously relied on discredited cocon-spirator testimony in concluding that his base offense level was 36; and (2) downwardly departed to adjust for any potential miscalculation in drug quantity, thereby effectively basing his sentence on a total offense level of 38, not 42. This argument fails because Amendment 782 does not reduce Johnson’s applicable Guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (explaining that defendant is not entitled to sentence reduction where amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range”); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (recognizing that § 3582(c)(2) requires sentence reductions to be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”).

In determining eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a court properly considers “the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment ] to the guidelines ... had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). For this purpose, a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is considered to be “the guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal histoiy category determined pursuant to lBl.l(a), which is *98 determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” Id. § 1B.1.10 cmt. n. 1 (A) (emphasis added).

Here, the district court found that Johnson was responsible for trafficking 10 to 30 kilograms of heroin, resulting in a base offense level of 36. After applying aggravating firearm and role enhancements, the court determined that Johnson’s total offense level was 42. With Johnson’s category III criminal history, this resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment. Had it been in effect at the time of sentencing, Amendment 782 would have reduced Johnson’s total offense level from 42 .to 40. Nevertheless, his applicable pre-departure Guidelines range would have remained 360 months’ to life imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Johnson is ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See id. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).

Insofar as Johnson claims eligibility because his sentence was infected by procedural error in the district court’s use of discredited testimony in calculating his base offense level, this argument cannot be pursued on a motion for a sentence reduction. See United States v. Mock, 612 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[N]either the district court nor this Court is free to address, in a proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), defendant’s arguments regarding procedural errors at his original, now-final sentencing.”). Rather, the argument was properly raised on direct appeal, where it was rejected by this court on the merits. See United States v. Rivera, 104 F.3d 354, 1996 WL 665721, at *1 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). Insofar as Johnson argues that the district court’s subsequent departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 means that the sentence was effectively based on a total offense level of 38, that departure is irrelevant for present purposes, as already mentioned. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1 (A).

We have considered Johnson’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.