SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant J. Taikwok Yung, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Irizarry, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Counter-claimant-Appellee Donald J. Trump on Trump’s counterclaim under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C, § 1125(d), and awarding Trump statutory damages. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, Yung’s appeal is limited to the district court’s summary judgment decision. He did not appeal the district court’s post-judgment denial of reconsideration. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). He also challenges the statutory damages award only in his reply brief, so we decline to consider the issue. See McBride v. BIG Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009).

We review de novo orders granting summary judgment, which shall be granted if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is *25 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Trump on his ACPA counterclaim, and we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough February 28, 2013 decision. In brief, there was no genuine dispute of material fact that (1) the “TRUMP” mark was distinctive at the time Yung acquired the infringing domain names, (2) those domain names were confusingly similar to the TRUMP mark, and (3) Yung had a bad-faith intent to profit from the TRUMP mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).

We have considered all of Yung’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.