SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Clare McCarthy-O’Keefe, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), in which it granted summary judgment in favor of Local 295/851 IBT Employer Group Pension Trust Fund (the “Fund”), Local 295/851 Board of Trustees, and DHL Worldwide Express, Inc. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Our review of orders granting summary judgment is de novo, and we focus on *146 whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In reviewing ERISA claims, district courts apply either a de novo or arbitrary and capricious standard of review based on an assessment of whether a plan gives an administrator discretion to determine eligibility. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008); Roganti v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 786 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 2015). If the district court engages in an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court’s review is limited to the administrative record. See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, McCarthy-O’Keefe does not dispute that the Fund had the discretion to determine eligibility. Therefore, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied, and the district court properly denied her motion to supplement the administrative record.

A court may overturn a benefits decision as arbitrary and capricious when it is “without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” Roganti, 786 F.3d at 211. The administrative record established sufficient evidence to support the Fund’s denial of eligibility for fund participation retroactive to her date of hire, and the district court properly granted summary judgment. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough February 24, 2015 decision.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.