SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Todd Hinz (“Hinz”) appeals from a June 25, 2015 judgment of the District Court granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee the Village of Perry (“the Village”). Hinz alleges that the Village, his former employer, discriminated against him, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., because he suffers from Crohn’s disease. Although Hinz argued below that he was the victim of discriminatory termination and retaliation, he has abandoned those claims on appeal. Instead, he challenges the judgment of the District Court only insofar as it rejected his hostile work environment claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences against the moving party.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Hinz presents three arguments on appeal. First,' he urges our Court to recognize a cause of action under the ADA for a hostile work environment. Second, he argues that the District Court erred in ruling that the complained-of conduct in Hinz’s workplace was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment. Finally, Hinz argues that the District Court erred in ruling that he failed to produce any evidence that he was “regarded as having ... an impairment” within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); see also id. § 12102(1).

This Court has “not yet decided whether a hostile work environment claim is cogni *4 zable under the ADA.” Robinson v. Dibble, 613 Fed.Appx. 9, 12 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). We need not resolve that issue today, because even if such a claim is cognizable, Hinz has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his employer regarded him as disabled. This question “turns on the employer’s perception of the employee” and is “a question of intent, not whether the employee has a disability.” Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1997). Hinz concedes that he never told the Village or any of its employees that he has Crohn’s disease, never requested an accommodation for his disease, and rarely took sick days. And, contrary to Hinz’s arguments, neither his supervisor’s alleged remarks nor the context in which they were made suggests a belief that Hinz was disabled. When asked if the employer ever said anything to Hinz that “made [Hinz] believe [the employer] knew [Hinz] had a disability,” Hinz stated, “I don’t know.” In short, we agree with the District Court that Hinz cannot show that defendant perceived Hinz to be impaired under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by Hinz on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.