SUMMARY ORDER

Jacqueline Wade appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Schofield, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VIP), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976 (“ADEA”), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Because Wade’s complaint is devoid of any allegations against the City of New York, all claims against the City of New York were properly dismissed. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA require a plaintiff to file a notice with the EEOC within 300 days of an alleged adverse action. See Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999) (ADA); Hodge v. N.Y. Coll. of Podiatric Med., 157 F.3d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1998) jADEA). Wade’s EEOC notice was filed qxactly 300 days after her termination; accordingly, Wade’s claims arising out of pre-termination conduct are untimely, as the district court ruled. “[Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). The district court was similarly correct to grant summary judgment on Wade’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims because Wade filed those claims outside the prescribed one-year statute of limitations applicable to claims against these defendants. See N.Y. EDUC. Law § 3813 2-b.

Wade’s failure-to-accommodate claim based on her inability to procure a chair with lumbar support faite because nothing in the record shows that Wade put her employer on notice of her foot surgery with the requisite medical documentation. See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co. Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009).

Wade’s only remaining claims are her Title Vll, ADEA, and ADA claims stemming from her termination of her probationary employment. For all three claims, the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) applies. See McBride, 583 F.3d at 96 (ADA); D’Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d 193, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2007) (ADEA); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (Title VII). *313 Here, defendants have articulated a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for Wade’s termination—namely reports that Wade verbally abused students, reports that were eventually substantiated by the Chancellor’s Office of Special Investigation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Wade’s failure to adduce evidence that this proffered explanation was pretextual is fatal to all three claims. The EEOC, in an amicus brief, argues powerfully that Wade’s breast cancer constitutes a disability under the ADA, and indeed Wade would qualify under the ADA even if the employer perceived her as disabled. But that, like Wade’s disagreement with the findings of the investigation, is immaterial. See McPherson v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In a discrimination case, however, we are decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff. We are interested in what ‘motivated the employer’; the factual validity of the underlying imputation against the employee is not at issue.” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983))).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Wade’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.