SUMMARY ORDER

Following entry of final judgment on September 24, 2015, Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas Ames appeals from two pre-trial rulings of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.), entered on September 17 and 18, 2015, precluding Ames from introducing into evidence at trial a report prepared by the Correctional Association of New York (“Association”), a private, nonprofit organization. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review for abuse of discretion the admission of evidence.” Abascal v. Fleckenstein, 820 F.3d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 2016). “A district court is said to abuse its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or renders a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Gomez v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Ames sought to introduce the Association’s report under Rule 803(8) of the Fed *42 eral Rules of Evidence, the public-records exception to the rule against hearsay. That Rule extends only to “[a] record or statement of a public office” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (emphasis added). The district court concluded “that the Correctional Association is not a ‘public office' under Rule 803(8), and its reports should not be analyzed as such.” Ames v. Stevens, No. 9:12-cv-01487 (MAD/RFT), 2015 WL 5513021, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015). This holding proved prescient; several months later, we reached the same conclusion in a different case. See Abascal, 820 F.3d at 566 (“The Association is not a public agency. [Its] Report, therefore, is not a record or statement from a public office.”).

Ames argues that Abascal either was wrongly decided or is distinguishable because, Ames contends, it did not consider that the public-records exception “is not limited to public agencies, and can encompass non-governmental entities as well.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8 (citing United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1997)). We believe that the holding in Abascal resolves this issue, and the Association is not the type of nongovernmental entity that falls within the Rule’s ambit. Indeed, we are unaware of any case holding that an entity like the Association, a private, nonprofit advocacy organization with permissive powers to visit prisons and prepare reports on their conditions for the government and the wider public, qualifies as a “public office” within the meaning of Rule 803(8). The cases cited in Ames’s brief involving nongovernmental entities deemed “public offices” for purposes of the Rule all involve entities operating under an ongoing legal duty to perform a function for the government, see, e.g,, Erickson v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d 952, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2001), acting at the behest of the government, see, e.g., Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, No. 98-126 C, 2004 U.S. Claims LEXIS 363, at *22, 2004 WL 2450874, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 17, 2004), or that are themselves governmental subcommittees, see Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1215 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (admitting as a public record a report from a legislative subcommittee constituted by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 103.71 and consisting entirely of members of the Ohio State Legislature).

In sum, we find no reason to part with Abascal’s conclusion that the Association is “an independent nonprofit organization” that does not qualify as a "public office” within the meaning of Rule 803(8). See 820 F.3d at 566-67.

We have considered all of Ames’s contentions on appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.