15‐3423‐cv Lee v. Katz

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of October, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, BRIAN M. COGAN, District Judge.

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LINDA A. LEE, Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. 15‐3423‐cv

JOETTE KATZ, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Families, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

 Judge Brian M. Cogan, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. Defendants‐Appellees.

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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: LINDA A. LEE, pro se, Milford, Connecticut.

FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: JENNIFER P. BENNETT, Assistant Attorney General (George Jepsen, Attorney General, Ann E. Lynch, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut (Thompson, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Linda A. Lee, pro se, appeals from the district courtʹs

judgment entered September 30, 2015 in favor of defendants‐appellees Joette Katz,

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Families, and the

Connecticut Department of Children and Families. On September 30, 2015, the district

court granted defendantsʹ motion to dismiss with prejudice Leeʹs claims under the

Rehabilitation Act,

et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act,

et seq., pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) and 41(b), for

her failure to comply with discovery obligations.

We review a district courtʹs imposition of sanctions, including dismissal,

under Rules 37 and 41 for abuse of discretion. Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the above.

(2d Cir. 2009) (Rule 37); Lewis v. Rawson,

(2d Cir. 2009)

(Rule 41). In evaluating a district courtʹs dismissal, we examine, among other things,

the following factors: ʺ(1) the willfulness of the non‐compliant party or the reason for

noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of

noncompliance[;] and (4) whether the non‐compliant party had been warned of the

consequences of . . . noncompliance.ʺ Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302 (quoting Nieves v. City of

New York,

(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see also Lewis,

.

We have reviewed the district courtʹs thorough and well‐reasoned

decision and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

the action with prejudice. The district court carefully reviewed the facts and

procedural history and weighed the relevant factors. The district court noted that Lee

had been reminded of her discovery obligations and warned of the consequences of

non‐compliance on numerous occasions. The district court concluded that Leeʹs

noncompliance was willful, as she responded directly to discovery obligations by

explaining why she was not complying and the reasons she gave were ʺunsupported.ʺ

The district court found that Leeʹs ʺhigh degree of intractability and willfulnessʺ

showed that she was ʺunpersuadableʺ and that dismissal was therefore ʺappropriate.ʺ

The district court also considered the duration of the noncompliance (from January 2014

through September 2015) and the numerous extensions Lee had been granted.

3 In light of Leeʹs repeated and willful non‐compliance with her discovery

obligations and the courtʹs scheduling orders, we conclude that the district court acted

within its discretion in dismissing Leeʹs case.

We have considered all of Leeʹs remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk

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