SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Song Ye, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 24, 2015, decision of the BIA affirming a January 7, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ye’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Song Ye, No. A200 931 588 (B.I.A. Feb. 24, 2015), aff'g No. A200 931 588 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 7, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity "with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency may, “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances, ... base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant,” and inconsistencies in the record evidence “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); accord Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Ye was not credible as to his claim that he suffered and fears persecution in China on account of his Christian faith.

The IJ reasonably relied on Ye’s demeanor, noting that he was hesitant and vague while testifying. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). That finding is supported by the record.

The IJ’s demeanor finding and the overall credibility determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies regarding when Ye was arrested, how severely he was injured in detention, why he failed to seek medical care after his release from detention, and with whom he attends bible study in the United States. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67 & n.3. Moreover, the agency reasonably questioned Ye’s credibility as to his religious practice because he claimed to have proselytized to Chinese villagers about the gospels, but he could not explain the gospels at his hearing. See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that there may be “instances in which the nature of an individual applicant’s account would render his lack of a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and could therefore provide substantial evidence in support of an adverse credibility finding”).

Moreover, the agency reasonably relied further on Ye’s failure to submit corroborating evidence sufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency reasonably declined to credit evidence *602 that was inconsistent with Ye s testimony, as well as unsworn letters from Ye’s mother and friend in China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).

Accordingly, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). That determination is dispositive of Ye’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief 'because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). As a consequence, we do not consider the agency’s alternative bases for denying relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED, As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).