SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Juma Sampson, pro se, appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion, filed in 2014, seeking a new sentencing hearing, the issuance of an amended judgment of conviction, and refund of special assessment fees. Sampson’s 2002 conviction was partially vacated by this Court in 2004, and the district court, on motion of the government, dismissed those two counts in June 2005. Sampson filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in January 2006, which was denied, and this Court granted in' part and denied in part his motion for a certificate of appealability. On remand, the district court denied all relief, and this Court denied his motion for a certificate of appealability. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Upon review, we conclude that Sampson’s motion is best construed as a successive § 2255 motion because it challenged both the propriety of his judgment of conviction and his sentence. See Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2001) (“§ ‘2255 is generally the proper vehicle for a federal prisoner’s challenge to his conviction and sentence”). A district court may consider a successive § 2255 motion only if the movant first obtains from this Court an order authorizing consideration of the successive motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). “[W]hen a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief or § 2255 motion is filed in a district court without [such authorization], the district court should transfer the petition or motion to this Court in the interest of justice pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1631].” Liriano v. United *2 States, 95 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding this directive, the district court did not commit reversible error by denying, rather than transferring, Sampson’s motion because transfer to this Court would have been futile.

We are required to dismiss any claim made in a proposed successive § 2255 motion, unless it is based on: (1) newly discovered evidence that would establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). A claim that was presented in a prior § 2255 motion must also be dismissed. See Gallagher v. United States, 711 F.3d 315, 315 (2d Cir. 2013). We consider Sampson to have abandoned his claim of entitlement to a new sentencing hearing because his brief does not pursue that claim. Sampson claims that he was entitled to an amended judgment specifying that two counts against him were dismissed; but that claim was previously raised and does not meet the successive-motion requirements. Sampson therefore presents no non-frivolous challenge to the district court's denial of his motion.

To the extent that Sampson’s request for the issuance of an amended judgment may be construed as a request to correct a clerical error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 instead of a challenge to his underlying conviction, his claim would be barred by the law of the case, under which doctrine a court may not reconsider “issues that were decided—or that could have been decided—during prior proceedings” in the same ease. United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 2007). Because Sampson has raised this argument previously and it was denied, the claim is barred.

Notwithstanding the law-of-the-case doctrine, this Court has the power to reconsider a prior ruling if “there has been an intervening change of controlling law, new evidence has become available, or there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice” United States v. Minicone, 26 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We exercise that power with respect to Sampson’s claim that he is entitled to a refund of $200—the special assessments he paid on account of the two counts of conviction that were subsequently vacated and dismissed—and we hold that he is entitled to such a refund.

We have considered all of Sampson’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court insofar as it denied Sampson’s belated request for an amended judgment. However, we instruct that an order be entered directing the government to refund to Sampson the sum of $200.