SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-appellants Hampshire Recreation, LLC (“Hampshire”) appeal the March 25, 2016 judgment of the District Court, granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On appeal, Hampshire requests review of the District Court’s rulings on two causes of action: (1) a claim under Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) a retaliation claim under the First Amendment. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, which have been remanded to the New York Supreme Court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal. For the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we find both claims to be without merit.

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We review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (inter *100 nal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

First, the District Court appropriately dismissed Hampshire’s selective enforcement claim because Hampshire is not similarly situated to its alleged comparators. Under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must plausibly show that it was “treated differently compared to others similarly situated.” Church of Am. Knight s of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2004). Unlike the three other recreational clubs, Hampshire is subject to different zoning regulations and initially did not have a Special Permit— facts that explain why it is not entitled to equal treatment with respect to its property use. “[Tjhese three other clubs ... are located entirely within the MR zoning district [whereas] Plaintiffs’ Property is split between the MR and R-20 zoning districts. (SAC ¶ 21.)” In the Matter of the Application of Hampshire Recreation, LLC v. Village of Mamaroneck, No. 14-CV-7228 (CS), 2016 WL 1181727, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar 25, 2016) (“District Court Opinion”). Even if Hampshire were able to establish a class of similarly situated comparators, the District Court offers numerous reasons why the Village’s decision to award a probationary permit was not discriminatory under both “selection enforcement” and “elass-of-one” theories. Accordingly, we find Hampshire’s Equal Protection claim to be without merit.

Second, the District Court rightly concludes that the Village’s issuance of the violation notice and its pursuit of enforcement actions—the only plausible retaliatory conduct—were too remote in time from the plaintiffs’ protected speech to sustain its retaliation claim under the First Amendment. 1 Id, at *9-10. “Even if one interpreted Plaintiffs’ protected activity to have begun in April 2012, when they first announced their intent to pursue rezoning, ... the first purportedly retaliatory act did not occur until approximately one and a half years later, far too late to support the required plausible inference. See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (causal connection established where ‘protected activity [is] closely followed in time by the adverse action’.) District Court Opinion at *10. Since Hampshire fails to present evidence of retaliatory conduct, the, District Court properly dismissed Hampshire’s retaliation claim under the First Amendment.

After Hampshire’s repeated failures to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion to deny leave to amend and to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of appellant’s claims on appeal and found them to be without merit. For the’ foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.