SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Burudi Faison, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rios, 765 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When considering a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a district court must first determine whether the defendant is eligible for a reduction. United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2013). If the defendant is eligible, the district court may exercise its discretion to reduce the original sentence after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, id. and “the post-sentencing behavior of the defendant and any public safety concerns a reduction in sentence would raise,” United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2011); see Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 532, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (“[E]ven where a defendant is permitted to seek a reduction, the district judge may conclude that a reduction would be inappropriate.”). A defendant’s post-sentencing conduct is an appropriate and sufficient justification for the denial of a sentence reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 716 F.3d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Figueroa, 714 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Faison’s motion. Although Faison was eligible for a sentence reduction, “[a] retroactive amendment to the Guidelines merely authorizes a reduction in sentence; it does not require one.” Wilson, 716 F.3d at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering whether a reduction was warranted in this case,' the District Court considered the appropriate factors, particularly Faison’s criminal history and prison disciplinary infractions, and reasonably denied his request for a reduction.

We reject Faison’s argument that the District Court violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by refusing to reduce his sentence. Faison’s theory rests on a “class-of-one” equal protection claim, in which “ ‘the plaintiff alleges that [ ]he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000)). Faison has not demonstrated that any potential comparators are “prima facie identical” to him, Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005), and, in any event, we have concluded that the District Court had a rational basis for denying Faison’s request—among other things, his individual criminal history and misconduct while imprisoned.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Faison’s remaining arguments and find them to be *723 without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the District Court.